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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Utah ) 
municipal corporation, 
et al., ) 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ) BRIEF 
-vs- ) Civil No. 14689 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION ) 
OF FIREFIGHTERS, LOCALS 
1645, 593, 1654, and 2064, ) 
Defendants-Appellants. ) 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Respondents brought this action seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the Utah Firefighters' Negotiations Act is un-
constitutional because it calls for binding arbitration and 
obligates elected officials to comply with decisions of a non-
elected three member commission. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Judge James S. Sawaya granted Plaintiffs-Respondents1 Motion 
for Summary Judgment and held Section 34-20a-l, et seg., Utah Code 
Arm. 1953, to be unconstitutional. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek this court to affirm the judgment of the 
lower court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The uncontested facts, as established by affidavits filed 
in support of the Plaintiffs-Respondents' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, are as follows: 
1. The 41st Legislature in its general session passed an 
adopted a law knov/n as Senate Bill 190, which was signed and 
ostensively became a law of this state on or about May 13, 1975. 
A copy of said statute is attached hereto as Appendix "A" for 
the Court's convenient reference. Among other provisions, this 
law provides: 
(a) The plaintiff cities are required to enter into 
"collective bargaining" concerning wages, hours and other 
conditions of employment and execute a written contract 
with Firefighter Unions. This right is not extended to 
any other municipal officer or employee, regardless of 
their Union affiliation. The bill conspicuously does not 
include other Civil Service employees assigned to the 
police departments of the plaintiff cities. (Section 
34-20a-l, Utah Code Ann., 1953). 
(b) If the plaintiff cities and the appropriate Fire-
fighter Unions fail to reach agreement within designated 
periods, unresolved issues are submitted to an arbitration 
panel or commission. This commission is not elected; rather, 
it is comprised of three individuals: one selected by each 
party and the third selected from a list provided by the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The decision 
of this arbitration commission by this law is binding and 
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and final (with the force of lav; against these cities and 
their elected representatives), except as to salary and 
wages. 
(c) Officers of the plaintiff cities can be forced 
into the Firefighter Bargaining Unit, by regular vote, 
but by law are prohibited from being on the negotiating 
team which negotiates their wages, conditions and terms 
of employment. (See Appendix, Section 34-20a~l, Utah 
Code Ann, 1953). 
2. The within action was originally filed on behalf of 
Salt Lake City, Provo City, Ogden City, Murray City, Logan City, 
the Utah League of Cities and Towns (an organization of approxi-
mately 200 of the 215 cities and towns of the State of Utah), 
South Salt Lake City, and Harold C. Newman and Evan C. Baker, 
officers of the Salt Lake City Fire Department, Each of these 
plaintiffs contend that Senate Bill 190 is unconstitutional for 
the reasons more particularly hereinafter set forth. However, 
on motion of the Defendants-Respondents, the lower court dis-
missed the League of Cities and Towns and South Salt Lake City 
as parties-plaintiff; further, the Court ordered that Locals 593, 
1654, 2064 and 2148 be joined as involuntary parties-defendant 
by the Plaintiffs-Respondents. (R-19-49; R-53). 
3. Prior to the decision of the lower court determining 
that Senate Bill 190 (subject of this appeal) was unconstitu-
tional, Local 1645 of the International Association of Fire-
fighters demanded and obtained recognition as exclusive bargain-
ing agent for Salt Lake City firefighters. (R-196) Th^ pro-
posed a contract which included a manning provision, which 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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requested that some firefighting units be increased from 4 to 
5 members. The requested contract also sought increased fringe 
benefits, such as health and accident insurance, life insurance, 
mileage allowance and related matters which have an economic 
impact, but which may not be considered a "wage11 or "salary" 
matter. Further, the proposal requested equipment acquisition 
and purchases which potentially could have a substantial economic 
impact on the city budget. (See, Affidavit of Lynn Marsh, and 
the proposed contract attached as Exhibit "A" thereto). (R-108-
110-126). 
3. Salt Lake City firefighters work 24 hour shifts, during 
which shift they are permitted to attend to personal needs, in-
cluding sleeping, eating and relaxing. Their work schedule is 
such that they work an average of 10 days per month for an average 
of a 56 hour work week; this work week, as above stated, includes 
their sleep time. (See, Affidavit of Chief Leon DeKorver, R-167). 
4. If the Salt Lake City Fire Department were to go to a 
52 hour week, it would require hiring approximately 90 additional 
men, at a cost of approximately $1,090,000. If a 42 hour work 
week were ordered by an arbitrator, it would require the hiring 
of an additional 114 men, at a total additional cost of approxi-
mately $1,378,000. (R-168). 
5. If the Salt Lake City Fire Department were required to 
implement the manning suggestion of the contract of Local 1645, it 
would require the hiring of 31 additional men at an additional 
cost of approximately $384,000 per annum. (R-168). 
6. If the present level of Salt Lake City service and 
manning is to be maintained, but an arbitration award were 
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rendered permitting the time off for Union business, it would 
require the additional hiring of several additional men at an 
approximate cost of $9,000 per annum per man. (R-168). 
7. If a binding arbitration award were entered granting 
overtime to be computed on the basis suggested by the Union, 
it would cost Salt Lake City taxpayers approximately $2f;,000 
per year. Further, if "trade union" type work, such as changing 
tap washers, painting running boards, wall and window washing, 
were eliminated from duties firefighters performed while other-
wise unoccupied at the fire stations, it would cost Salt Lake City 
in excess of $10,000 per year. (R-168). 
8, Thus, a binding arbitration award granting the Union its 
demands on issues (other than those involving salary or wages) 
could result in a minimum economic impact on Salt Lake City of 
$2,896,000 per year and require the hiring of an additional 145 
employees. (R-168) Of course, the economic impact would multiply 
in subsequent years, as these additional men progress through the 
City merit pay increase program and acquire additional vacation 
and sick leave benefits through longevity. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTIONS 34-20a-l, ET SEQ., WHICH PERMIT A THREE 
MEMBER COMMISSION OR ARBITRATION PANEL TO MAKE 
AWARDS AND DECISIONS WHICH ARE BINDING ON ELECTED 
OFFICIALS OF THE PLAINTIFF CITIES, IS AN UNCON-
STITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS. 
A. THE BINDING ARBITRATION STATUTE VIOLATES ART. 
VI, § 29, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, TOGETHER WITH 
WELL-SETTLED LAW PROHIBITING THE DELEGATION OF 
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS. 
Senate Bill 190, passed by one vote on the last day of the 
-5-
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1975 General Legislative Session, purports by legislative fiat, 
to require the plaintiff Utah municipalities to bargain collec-
tively with firefighters concerning "wages, hours, and other 
conditions of employment." In the event that impasse is reached 
on these negotiations, all unresolved issues are to be sub-
mitted to a three member arbitration panel or commission, which 
commission shall be comprised of one member selected by the muni-
cipality, one by the Union and the third selected from the list 
submitted by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. 
Significantly, the law states: 
"The determination of the majority of the board of 
arbitration thus established shall be final and binding 
on all matters in dispute except in salary or wage 
matters which shall be considered advisory only, . . . " 
34-20a-9, Utah Code Ann., 1953 (Replacement Vol. 4B, 
1975 Pocket Supp.) (Emphasis added) 
Thus, except as to salary and wages, the Utah Legislature has 
attempted to establish a commission or panel with binding powers 
over local elected officials concerning all matters concerning 
employee hours and other conditions of employment. This fact is 
true even though the panel is comprised of people who are not 
elected and who may not even be residents of this area or, in 
fact, have any personal familiarity with it whatsoever. It is 
further true despite the fact that they are not responsible or 
accountable to any elected official of the City or the State. 
Wisely, the constitutional framers prohibited such a shocking 
invasion of the prerogatives of a democratic representative local 
government and any attempt to run local affairs by appointed 
persons or commission, not directly responsible to the electorate. 
This provision provides: 
_£-
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"The Legislature shall not delegate to any special 
commission, private corporation or association, any . 
power to make, supervise, or interfere witn any 
municipal improvement, money, property or effects, 
whether held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, and 
to select a capital site, or to perform any municipal 
functions," Art. VI, § 29, Constitution of Utah. 
(Emphasis added) 
Utah case law decisions have been consistent in stating that the 
purpose of this constitutional provision was to guarantee the 
right of Utah cities to self-government. Further, the provision 
was to assure that Utah cities would be free from outside super-
vision and control. For that reason, the term "municipal 
function" has been given a broad reading. The Court has suc-
cinctly stated: 
"It is to be kept in mind that the very purpose of 
Section 29, Art^ . VI, hereinabove quoted, prohibiting the 
delegation of powers of supervision to any 'special 
commission' over cities was to insure, insofar as practi-
cable, the powers to cities and towns to manage their own 
internal affairs, as previously articulated by this court, 
'To hold inviolate the right of local self-government. . .' 
(sic) 
" . . . the term 'municipal' as used in connection with 
. . . municipal function, was used in its broad sense 
and would include any activity properly engaged in by the 
city or municipality, whether governmental or proprietary." 
State Water Pollution Control Bd. v. Salt Lake City, 6 
Utah 2d 247, 311 P.2d 370, 374, also citing Logan City v. 
Public Utilities Commission, 72 Utah 536, 271 P. 961, 972 
(1928); Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 103 Utah 186, 134 P.2d 469 (1943); see also, 
Lighten v. Abington Tp., 9 Atl.2d 609, 613 (Pa. 1939), 
which was cited with approval in State Water Pollution 
Control Bd. v. Salt Lake City, id. (Emphasis added) 
With virtually identical reasoning our Court voided the 
Civil Auditorium and Sports Arena Act. The Court held that the 
Act created a special commission in violation of Art. VI, § 29, 
of the Utah Constitution; it stated: 
-7-
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"We are convinced that the framers of our state con-
stitution .wisely anticipated the inroads that might be 
cut in „the structure of "local] representative government, 
which fundamentally is composed of officials elected by 
those closest to government, the electors, when they 
judiciously assisted on incorporating Art. VI, Sec. 29, 
as a must in our constitution. We hold that this act 
attempted to create a special commission offensive to 
the plain terms of Art. VI, Sec. 29, Backman v. Salt Lake 
County, 13 Ut.2d 412, 375 P.2d 756 (1962). (Emphasis added) 
The Court in this Backman decision outlined the conditions which 
were deemed to be necessary to create a commission to perform 
municipal functions, in violation of Art. VI, § 29, of the 
Constitution; it stated: 
"Three conditions are necessary to violate the pro-
visions: (Art. VI, Sec. 29) Delegation of a private 
commission of power to 2) interfere with municipal 
property or 3) to perform a municipal function*" 
Backman v. Salt Lake County, id. at p. 760. 
The Court then held that the recreation Sports Arena Board was 
such a special commission which offended this constitutional 
provision. 
Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court has applied Art. VI, 
§ 29 of the Utah Constitution to labor matters. This case 
involved an issue as to whether a decision to reinstate a city 
employee by a City Appeal Board should be affirmed (despite a 
subsequent City Board of Commissioners1 decision to terminate 
w that employee). The Court reasoned from Art. VI, § 29 and held 
that the Appeal Board's decision was not binding on the City 
Commission. Thus, the Court upheld a dismissal by the City 
Commission and specifically stated: 
"The responsibility for the operation of the city 
government rests with the City Commission who are elected 
by and responsible to the public. It therefore seems 
reasonable to assume that the legislature intended that 
it have the final voice in policy-making decisions as the 
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statute expressly states. If the action of the Appeal 
Board in reinstating an employee were final as plaintiff 
contends, the ability of the City Commission to fulfill 
the responsibilities imposed upon it would be seriously 
impaired. It was undoubtedly to prevent such impair-
ment, and to keep responsibility where it belongs that 
our Constitution provides that the legislature may not 
delegate municipal functions to any special commission. 
Furthermore, if the legislature had intended the statute 
to be so applied that the Appeal Board, a majority of 
which are fellow employees, should have final authority 
to make such a determination, there may well be a serious 
doubt as to whether this constitutional provision (Art. 
VI, § 29) would be infringed." Gord v. Salt Lake City, 
20 Ut.2d 138, 434 P.2d 449, 453 (1967). 
The Court thereafter chose not to invalidate the statute 
under discussion, but construed it to avoid the constitutional 
conflict. However, the rationale clearly indicates that the 
terms and conditions of employment are "municipal functions" 
within the meaning of Art. VI, § 29, of the Utah Constitution. 
There is little question that, if the statute establishing Appeal 
Boards could not have been construed to be merely advisory to the 
Commission, the law would have been declared void. 
Other courts considering this problem have likewise ruled 
that tenure, compensation and working conditions are municipal 
and legislative functions. The Missouri Supreme Court stated 
this principal as follows: 
"The whole matter of qualifications, tenure, compensa-
tion and working conditions for any public service, 
involves the exercise of legislative powers. Except to 
the extent that all the people have themselves settled 
any of these matters by writing them into the constitution, 
they must be determined by their chosen representatives 
who constitute the legislative body. It is a familiar 
principal of constitutional law that the legislature cannot 
delegate its legislative powers and any attempted delegation 
thereof is void . . . . Thus, qualifications, tenure, 
compensation, and working conditions of public officers 
and employees are wholly matters of lawmaking. . . . " 
City of Springfield v. Clouse, 206 S.W.2d 539 (Mo., 1947), 
cited with approval in City of Aurora, Colorado v. Aurora 
-9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Firefighters Protective Association, et al., District 
Court in and for the County of Adams, Colorado, Civil No. 
26743, decided April 22, 1976, and copied at R-152. 
Thus, the writer respectfully suggests that the creation 
of a three member commission called a Board of Arbitration, 
whose decisions are final and binding upon the elected represen-
tatives of the people, regarding all matters relating to Fire 
Department operations and procedures (excepting only wage and 
salary matters), is a usurpation of the prerogatives and the 
municipal functions. These functions are vested exclusively, by 
the Utah Constitution, in the elected officials of the plaintiff 
cities; as such, the binding arbitration feature of this statute 
is patently unconstitutional and should be so ruled by this court. 
Many other decisions which have given thoughtful consideration 
to binding arbitration laws, have likewise ruled it to be in vio-
lation of well established law which prohibits the delegation of 
legislative functions and/or of constitutional provisions similar 
to Art. VI, § 29. Some such decisions are as follows: 
A. Washington. In a well researched and reasoned opinion 
our sister state, Washington, held unconstitutional an amendment 
to a city charter, which provided for binding arbitration con-
cerning labor disputes between firemen and the City. This court 
observed: 
"'Contract clauses, requiring the arbitration of dis-
putes or grievances between the municipality and the 
Union by 'neutral and impartial persons' and agreeing 
that the results will be binding, have been held invalid 
on two grounds: (1) that city officers may not bargain 
away or delegate to others the exercise of authority or 
discretion confided in themselves by law; (2) that since 
disputes may concern the hiring or discharge of employees, 
which matters may be governed by the merit system or 
civil service laws, city officers may not consent to any 
other method of dealing with such matters in the absence 
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of statutory authority. * * *f ,f State v. Johnson, 278 
P.2d 663, 664. (Other citations omitted) 
This Washington Court also cited with approval Springfield 
v. Clouse, above cited, concerning the illegality of binding 
arbitration provisions relating to public employees; it observed: 
"'Under our form of government, public office or employ-
ment never has been and cannot become a matter of bargaining 
and contract. (Citations omitted) This is true because the 
whole matter of qualifications, tenure, compensation and 
working conditions for any public service, involves the 
exercise of legislative powers/ Except to the extent that 
all the "people have themselves settled any of these matters 
by writing them into the Constitution, they must be deter-
mined by their chosen representatives who constitute the 
legislative body. It is a familiar principle of constitu-
tional law that the legislature cannot delegate its legis-
lative powers and any attempted delegation thereof is void. 
11 Am.Jur. 921, Sec. 214, 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 
133, (page 337); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 
U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570. If such powers 
cannot be delegated they surely cannot be bargained or con-
tracted away; and certainly not by any administrative or 
executive officers who cannot have any legislative powers. 
Although executive and administrative officers may be 
vested with a certain amount of discretion and may be 
authorized to act or make regulations in accordance with 
certain fixed standards, nevertheless the matter of making 
such standards involves the exercise of legislative powers. 
Thus qualifications, tenure, compensation and working con-
ditions of public officers and employees are wholly matters 
of lawmaking and cannot be the subject of bargaining or 
contract.'" State v. Johnson, id at p. 664, citing City of 
Springfield v. Clouse, 206 S.W.2d 539, 554, (Mo. 1947). 
(Emphasis added) 
The Washington Court correctly defined the issue and held 
the binding arbitration law invalid as an illegal delegation of 
legislative power; it said: 
"Can the legislative body abdicate its responsibility 
and turn it over to a board of arbitrators whose decision 
will be binding upon the legislative body and the firemen? 
Clearly it has no legal right to do so. The theory of 
delegation of authority is that the person or group to 
whom authority has been delegated, acts for and as the 
agent of the person or group delegating such authority. 
That is not the situation here. Here the council would 
-11-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be stepping out of the picture entirely and the arbitra-
tion board would be performing a function which, by law, 
is the responsibility of the council." State v. Johnson, 
id. at p. 666.^ (Emphasis added) 
B. Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that 
a State statute purporting to grant an arbitration panel binding 
powers on a city legislative body was invalid and unconstitutional, 
The Court reasoned from Art. 3, Section 20, of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, which is virtually identical to Art. VI, § 29, of 
the Utah Constitution. This Pennsylvania Constitutional pro-
vision provided: 
"The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special 
commission, private corporation or association, any power 
to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improve-
ment, money, property, or effects, whether held in trust 
or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal 
function whatever." Art. 3, Sec. 20, Pennsylvania Con-
stitution. 
The Court then summarized the law concerning delegation of legis-
lative functions as follows: 
"If the delegation of power is to make the law, which 
involves a discretion of what the law shall be, then the 
power is non-delegable. If the conferred authority is 
the power or discretion to execute the law already deter-
mined and circumscribed, then the delegation is unobjec-
tionable. If we are correct in this interpretation of 
the rule, then there is no question but that the power to 
fix municipal salaries and to create a pension plan is 
non-delegable under our Constitution, for these matters, 
as have been mentioned above, are purely municipal 
functions. We are of the opinion, therefore, that if the 
Act of 1947 makes the findings of the panel of concilia-
'tors binding upon the city insofar as the creation of 
^ote: At page 14 of Appellants' brief is cited an apparently 
unpublished county court decision. Only a summary of that 
decision is available at the source cited; in any event, it 
neither overrules the Johnson case or its reasoning. 
-12-
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municipal ordinances is concerned, then that portion of 
the Act which so states is unconstitutional and cannot be 
enforced in this proceeding." Erie Firefighters Local No, 
293 v. Gardiner, 178 A.2d 691, 695 (Pa., 1962). 
Thereafter, Pennsylvania specifically amended this provision 
of its Constitution to permit binding arbitration and, thus, 
binding arbitration was subsequently upheld as valid in that 
state. See, Harney v. Russo, 225 A.2d 560 (Pa., 1969). 
C. South Dakota. Of identical reasoning and import is a 
recent decision of our sister state, South Dakota. This case >.s 
on all fours with the case before the bar and involved a charter 
provision mandating binding arbitration, through a three member 
panel. Like Utah, South Dakota's Constitution contained a pro-
vision which made it unlawful to delegate legislative power and 
interfere with municipal functions pursuant to provision of Art. 
Ill, § 26, of its Constitution. Like the Utah decisions above 
cited, that court noted that its constitutional provision had 
been passed when the framers saw a need "to cure the evil 'of 
interference with municipal functions by the legislature of this 
state.1" Thus, the South Dakota court stated: 
"We hold, therefore, that under the language of Art. 
Ill, § 26, of this State's Constitution SDLC 9-14A-18 
(binding arbitration for firefighters) is clearly 
unconstitutional." City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls 
Firefighters, Local 814, 234 N.W.2d 35, 38 (S.D., 1975). 
D. California. The California Court of Appeals, First 
District, has recently reversed the Superior Court ruling; this 
appellate court held void a memorandum agreement between San Fran-
cisco and its firemen, which called for binding arbitration. The 
Court stated that the existence of an arbitration clause in a labor 
contract was an unauthorized delegation of legislative power, pre-
served by City charter in the elected officials. San Francisco 
- i ^-
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Firefighters Local 798 v. City and County of San Francisco, 129 
Cal.Rep. 39 (Cal.Ct.App., 1976). In so holding, it correctly 
distinguished Firefighters Union v. City of Vallejo, 526 P.2d 
971 (Cal., 1974), cited as authority by appellants at page 14 
of their brief. 
As the San Francisco case noted, the Vallejo decision merely 
gave effect to a charter provision, which specifically authorized 
arbitration. The San Francisco case found the City had no power 
to negotiate a contract for binding arbitration, in that the 
matters would involve the exercise of judgment and discretion 
which were in the nature of a "public trust" and could not be 
delegated. It further found that the binding arbitration clause 
was defective in that there werfe no sufficient standards or "safe-
guards" to prevent abuse; thus, in any event, it was an unlawful 
delegation of the legislative function. Id. at p. 303. 
E. Oregon. In 1975, the Court of Appeals of Oregon struck 
down a State statute requiring binding arbitration in labor matters. 
It ruled that provisions of the Oregon Constitution granted home 
rule powers to cities and held that the binding arbitration statute 
was an invasion into an area which was a matter of paramount city 
interest. Therefore, a City charter which reserved in the city 
the right to regulate city labor, took precedence over the State 
binding arbitration statute; it stated: 
"The central question is what legislative powers do 
the home rule amendments reserve to cities. 
" . . . 'The real test is not whether the state or the 
city has an interest in the matter, for usually they 
both have, but whether the state's interest or that of 
the city is paramount.1" City of Beaverton v. International 
Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 531 P.2d 730, 731 (Or. C/A, 1975). 
-14-
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The Court then reasoned that the administration of the fire depart-
ment and related matters were municipal functions whose paramount 
interest rested with the city and not the state; it stated: 
1,1
 If the legislative assembly has the power to deprive 
the people of municipalities of self-government in this 
respect, it would be difficult to imagine an area of 
activity engaged in by the city which could not be 
similarly controlled,1" City of Beaverton v. International 
Ass'n of Fire Fighters, id. at p. 735, citing KeiniQ v. 
Milwaukie, et al., 373 P.2d 686. 
This Oregon Court of Appeals decision was not accepted for review 
by the Oregon Supreme Court, which apparently approved the holding. 
Other decision of the Oregon Supreme Court have similarly 
affirmed the right of local governments to manage their municipal 
affairs as explained in the Beaverton case; further, Oregon has 
clearly sided with the authority above provided, which prohibits 
the delegation of legislative functions. In a related issue, the 
Oregon Supreme Court articulately stated that the Uniform Elec-
trical Code, approved by the American Standards Association, did 
not become the standards of Oregon without legislative action. It 
observed that a delegation of authority to non-elected political 
bodies by automatic incorporation of those standards without 
legislative review was illegal and stated: 
"No doubt its objectives are meritorious and its acti-
vities productive of much good. But the constitution does 
not sanction the delegation of legislative power to any 
private agency no matter how well qualified such agency 
may be. It must be borne in mind that the 'beneficial 
aims, however great or well directed, can never serve in 
lieu of constitutional power.1" Hillman v. Northern 
Wasco County People Utilities District, 323 P.2d 664, 674 
(Or., 1968), citing Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 
U.S. 238, 80 L.Ed. 1160. 
Thus, our sister state Oregon has clearly sided with the 
proposition that the operation of a fire department is a matter 
-15-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of predominant local concern and involves municipal functions. 
Those functions, therefore, are not appropriately a matter of 
delegation through some ad hoc commission, vested with power to 
bind elected officials to their decisions. 
F
- Colorado. The most recent decision concerning this 
issue comes from Colorado. Here the Supreme Court of Colorado 
struck down a binding arbitration city charter amendment which 
required good faith bargaining and arbitration on all matters, 
terms and conditions of employment. The Court held the compulsory 
binding arbitration clause of the city charter an unlawful 
delegation of legislative power. In so doing, it affirmed a 
previous 1962 decision, holding that a public employer " . . . 
cannot be forced to arbitrate disputes arising from a collective 
bargaining agreement." This court then correctly stated: 
"A contrary holding in our view, would seriously 
conflict with the basic tenets of a representative 
government. Fundamental among these tenets is the 
precept that officials engaged in governmental 
decision making (e.g., setting budgets, salaries, 
and other terms and conditions of public employment) 
must ha accountable to the citizens they represent. 
Binding arbitration removes these decisions from the 
aegis of elected representatives, placing them in 
the hands of an outside person who has no account-
ability to the public." The Greeley Police Union, et 
al., v. City Council of Greeley, et al., 553 P.2d 790, 
(Col., 197 6), citing with approval Dearborn Fire 
Fighters Union v. City of Dearborn, 2 31 N.W.2d 226 
(197 5), opinion of Mr. Justice Levin; Fellows v. , 
LaTroncia, 377 P.2d 547 (Colo., 1962). 
Thereafter, the Court cited Art. V, § 35 of the Colorado 
Constitution which is similar to the Utah Constitution, Art. VI, 
§29, and prohibits the Legislature from delegating to a "special 
commission the power to interfere with municipal government." 
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Thus, the binding arbitration charger provision was voided as 
an unlaw delegation of legislative functions belonging exclu-
2 
sively to the elected representatives of city government. 
G. Michigan. The Appellants-Unions cite Dearborn Fire 
Fighters Union Local 412, v. City of Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d 226 
(Mich., 1975) as authority for the proposition that binding and 
compulsory arbitration has been upheld; however, any fair reading 
of that case demonstrates that more accurately it supports the 
respondents' position. Judge Levin articulates the cause against 
binding arbitration as an unlawful delegation of legislative 
functions in perhaps the best reasoned, researched and written 
opinion of any case discovered by the writer. Contrary to the 
representation of the brief published by the Appellant Unions, 
Judge Levin concludes that the binding arbitration labor statute 
was unconstitutional and stated: 
"1969 P.O.A. (312). (binding arbitration statute) is 
unconstitutional-H Dearborn Fire Fighters Unidn Local 
412 v. City of Dearborn, id. at p. 243. 
However, that decision was given prospective application only. 
Judge Levin was joined in his conclusion by Judge Kavanagh. 
A thir<J judge in a separate opinion, upheld the decision 
applying the prospective effect of that decision; this Judge 
held the arbitration provisions valid on the facts as applied to 
that case only because the arbitrator was appointed by and respon-
sible to the electorate through an elected official, the governor. 
2 
*Note: Huff v. Mayor and City Council Colorado Springs, cited 
at p. 14 of defendant's brief, did not deal with any issue 
regarding binding arbitration and does not stand for the proposi-
tion for which it was cited by the appellant; rather, the 1976 
Greeley case, above cited, cites Huff and notes no conflict 
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See, Judge Williams; opinion commencing id. at page 252. The 
only other judge ruling on the case, wrote a separate dissenting 
opinion; he would have upheld the statute as constitutional, 
both as applied and per se. 
Clearly, this Michigan court would have ruled the Utah 
statute unconstitutional by at least a 3 to 4 margin; this con-
clusion is correct because our arbitration panel is not appointed 
by or responsible to any elected official. They are totally 
autonomous with the "neutral" appointment coming from a list 
supplied by Federal Mediation Service and none are responsible 
or accountable to any elected official. 
However, more important than the plurality decision is the 
astute insight given by the well researched opinion of Judge Levin, 
which was subsequently cited with approval in cases voiding arbi-
tration statutes similar to the Utah law under discussion. See, 
Greeley Police Union, et al. v. City Council of Greeley, supra. 
Regarding the real question at issue, Judge Levin cited Professor 
George W. Taylor with approval and noted: 
"'Some persons would 'simplify1 matters by 'forth-
rightly adopting some form of compulsory arbitration 
in all political jurisdictions. This course, until now, 
has be£n almost universally rejected in the private 
sector, because it would undermine private agreement-
making, which is the cornerstone of the enterprise 
system. Compulsory arbitration is not more, and perhaps 
less, appropriate in the government sector. For reasons 
expressed heretofore, a strike of government employees 
interferes with the orderly performance of the functions 
of representative government. Compulsory arbitration 
is a greater threat—it entails a delegation to 'outsiders' 
to the authority assigned by the electorate to elected 
officials, who are subject to the checks and balances of 
our governmental institutions.'" Dearborn Fire Fighters 
Union v. City of Dearborn, id. at p. 233, citing Taylor, 
Public Employment: Strikes or Procedures, 2 0 Industrial 
Labor Relations Rev., 617, 632 (1967). (Emphasis added) 
_i p -
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Judge Levin then cites with approval Bernstein, as follows: 
"'(C)ompulsory arbitration amounts to a delegation of 
the responsibilities of public management and of the 
law makers to outsiders. In my view, this is incompatible 
with the basic, principles of representative governmen.:, 
In fact, it can become almost a convenience to duck hard 
issues by passing them to a board that is only temporarily 
in office and that is not responsible to the electorate.1" 
Dearborn Fire Fighters Union v. City of Dearborn, id. at p. 
233, citing Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public 
Labor Relations, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 459, 467 (1971). 
(Emphasis added) 
It is correctly noted in the Dearborn decision that although 
arbitration awards may not necessarily result in raising taxes by 
an arbitrator, the decision may well affect the allocation of 
governmental expenditures within the political unit. The Judge 
then astutely states: 
111
 By relying upon arbitration, a governmental official 
can avoid an unpleasant decision for which he would other-
wise be politically accountable.1" Dearborn Fire Fighters 
Union v. City of Dearborn, id, at p. 236. 
In summary, the Judge states: 
"(The binding arbitration process), is not consonant 
with.the proper governace and is not an appropriate 
method for resolving legislative-political issues in a 
representative democracy." Dearborn Fire Fighters Union 
v. City of Dearborn, id., at p. 236. 
As the foregoing amply demonstrates, the assertion of 
Appellants at page 13 of this brief, that only one jurisdiction 
has voided binding arbitration statutory provisions, is a generous 
misstatement of fact. The massive citation of cases on pages 13 
and 14 of Appellants1 brief, with few exceptions, is "puff." 
Most of the cases do not stand for the proposition asserted, and 
in some instances, stand for directly opposite holdings and 
positions. 
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The Appellants' "formidable line" of authority more cor-
rectly represents a tangle of duplicitus citations from a single 
jurisdiction (e.g., 5 citations from New York alone) or citations 
relating to entirely different subjects, than the issue of com-
pulsory binding arbitration. However, rather than clutter the 
main body of this brief with rebuttal, the cases not heretofore 
distingushed will be discussed in the following note, in order 
that the court will not be misled by the facade of Appellants1 
"Maginot Line."3 
The wisdom of these cases striking down binding arbitration 
panels and, thus, preserving accountability in elected officials 
for the operation of government, is best illustrated by the 1975 
JNote: PROFESSIONAL FIRE FIGHTERS, INC. V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, 
384 P.2d 158 (1963). This case did not involve binding arbi-
tration; rather, this case involved the charge of discrimination, 
that is, the right to join or refrain from joining a labor 
organization. See footnote 1-4, id. at 384 P.2d 159-161, 169. 
Further, the case has no relevance to the case before the bar 
because Salt Lake City is not a charter city and the issues 
presented here are in no way similar. 
CITY OF BIDDEFORD TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 304 A.2d 387 (Me., 1973). 
In this case, a badly divided court stated that the binding 
arbitration statute under discussion was void, lacking adequate 
standards for legislative delegation. Three members of the six 
judge panel stated: 
"We hold that the legislature's attempt to delegate 
to the arbitrators binding determination of labor dis-
putes between teachers and their public employers is 
void for lack of adequate standards." City of Biddeford 
v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n., id. at p. 40. 
The other three members dissented from this holding and, thus, 
the decision stands for little, particularly in view of the fact 
that no constitutional provision similar to Utah's reserving 
municipal function to the city, was under discussion. In addi-
tion, it must be noted the other. Maine case cited held only 
that Maln.e law permitted city to sign an arbitration contract. 
It did not mandate binding arbitration as is the case in the Utah 
law under discussion. Rockland Professional Firefighters Ass'n. 
v. City of Rockland, 261 A.2d 418 (Me., 1976). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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arbitration award of Oakland, California. In this case, a charter 
provision passed in 1973 provided for compulsory and binding 
arbitration, after a negotiating impasse had been reached by police 
or firemen. In November of 1974, impasse was reached and an arbi-
trator was selected to make decisions concerning three major issues-
(a) a three percent salary increase over the City's last offer, 
(b) hours to be worked by firefighters, and (c) a manning issue. 
The arbitrator found for the Union on all issues; however, 
of specific relevance to the case before the bar, is the fact that 
the arbitrator ordered that the duty hours for firefighters be 
reduced to an average of 54 hours, effective July 1, 1975. (Like 
the Utah situation, these hours including sleep and other time used 
Note 3 cont. 
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SEWARD EDUCATION ASSOCIATION V. SCHOOL DISTRICT 
OF SEWARD, 199 N.W.2d 752 (Neb., 1972). This case merely stands 
for the proposition that Nebraska has a unique constitutional 
provision which specifically provides for a termination of con-
troversies in their school system through a court of industrial 
relations. See, id. at p. 756. , 
CITY OF MIDWEST V. CRAVENS, 532 P.2d 829 (Ok., 1975). Here, the 
court specifi6ally noted that the law did not require binding 
arbitration and, hence, did not deprive the local government 
" . . . the right to manage and control its fire department. . ."; 
rather, the law merely provided a uniform labor practice through 
the state. Id., at p. 833. 
» 
HARNEY V. RUSSO, 255 A.2d 560 (Pa., 1969). See, discussion, supra 
at p. 12. Like Nebraska, this case involved the unique consti-
tutional amendment, specifically authorizing binding arbitration 
in that state. 
LUHRS V. CITH OF PHOENIX, 83 P.2d 283 (Ariz., 1938). This case 
did not involve binding arbitration, but involved the validity of 
a state minimum wage and pension fund statute. It has no relevance 
to the issues pending before the court concerning delegation of 
legislative powers or functions to an arbitration panel. 
FIREFIGHTERS UNION, LOCAL 1186 V. CITY OF VALLEJO, 526 P.2d 971 
(Cal., 1974). This case does mention, without discussion or com-
ment, binding arbitration statutes; however, as construed, the 
case only stands for the enforcement of a city charter provision 
authorizing collective bargaining. See discussion at page 13, 
supra. 
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for personal needs on a 24-hour shift basis. L~:Further, he reduced 
the duty time to 52 hours as of January 1, 1976. This order alone 
resulted in the requirement of hiring 48 additional firemen. 
In addition, the arbitrator reversed the" elected councilmens' 
decision and ordered that each fire company was to be manned by 
5 instead of 4 men. This decision resulted in restoring 36 
positions eliminated by the elected representatives of Oakland. 
Also, he directed that additional firemen would be hired to pro-
vide routine relief for leaves of absence. This order resulted 
in the requirement of hiring 18 firemen, in addition to the other 
36 positions which were reinstated. 
The arbitrator, also awarded substantial increases in health 
insurance benefits, uniform allowances, overtime and holiday pay. 
Note 3 cont. 
HUFF V. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF COLORADO SPRINGS, 512 P.2d 
632 (Colo., 1963). As previously stated, this case does not 
deal with arbitration or assignment of legislative functions 
to arbitration panel; rather, it dealt with the right of the 
City to establish a pension plan, which conflicted with State law, 
BOARD OF TRUSTEE OF P. AND F. R. F. V. CITY OF PADUCAH, 333 S.W. 
2d 515 (Ky., 1960). This case stands for the proposition that 
Kentucky rejects " . . . positively and unequivocally, the theory 
that a right of local self-government inheres to Kentucky muni-
cipalities." Id. at p. 518. In addition to that position which 
our constitution and case law rejects, the case did not deal 
with binding arbitration or any issue relevant to the case, 
before the bar. Rather, it dealt with the validity of a State 
statute establishing a State retirement fund for police and fire-
men. Likewise, the other Kentucky case cited, Kentucky Municipal 
League v. the Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Labor, 535 
S.W.2d 198 (Ky.Ct.App., 1975), did not deal with the issues 
before this court. That case involved a challenge to the State's 
right to set a minimum wage of $1.30 per hour and establish a 
40 hour work week for employees exempted from the Fair Labor 
Standards Act under Federal law. Hence, there was no issue of 
delegation of legislative prefogatives or binding arbitration 
panels, not responsible to any elected body. 
DETROIT POLICE OFFICERS'S ASS'N V. DETROIT , 213 N.W.2d 803 
(Wis., 1974). This case obviously does not resolve the binding 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In addition, he awarded an agency shop, inclu.c3i.ng a grievance 
procedure which was itself binding and final, and included a 
virtual veto power over all future changes in fire department 
rules and regulations. He, also, provided the Union with the 
right to reopen negotiations within a month/ 
This arbitration award was made binding on the elected 
officials and was made despite a projected three (3) million 
dollar fiscal 1974-1975 deficit projection. In fact, the award 
alone was projected to cost the City of Oakland approximately 
2.5 million dollars /.. and the elected officials were left with 
the problem of solving the fiscal crisis by levying additional 
taxes or cutting services. Of this award, Mr. Gerald E. Newfarmer 
correctly noted: 
"The arbitration award is clearly a crushing blow 
to the City of Oakland. The 3% excess salary increase 
and the addition of 102 firemen to the City staff 
contribute to a total fiscal impact of more than 30% 
of the city fire payroll, without even mentioning the 
almost certain affect on policemen looking forward 
with new-found eagerness to 1975 negotiations. Of 
equal importance over the longer term will be the 
crippling affects of the new constraints on the ability 
of management (council and administration) to determine 
the level of service and to manage its delivery." 
Oakland Gets First Arbitration Award." Western City, 
March, *1975 at p. 16, 33. Also see, discussion of 
Judge Levin concerning this eventuality in Dearborn 
Fire Fighters Union Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 
Supra, .at P. :<lt6, (Emphasis added) 
Note 3 cont. • ' n^-,,-
arbitration issue or there would be no need for the 1975 
np^rhnrn case discussed supra. In fact, this dispute was one 
involving the issue of whether "residency" or "retirement" 
were properly subjects of labor "good faith bargaining." The 
case does not have a holding concerning binding arbitration 
panels or illegal legislative delegation. 
The New York, Wyoming.and Rhode Island cases do not uphold the 
validity of public employee or binding arbitration labor 
statutes. However, as discussed in Point IB, New York would 
have voided the Utah statute as an illegal delegation, without 
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Salt Lake City, and the other plaintiff-cities, likewise, 
could be in a similar position. As noted more particularly in 
the Statement of Facts and the uncontroverted affidavits of record, 
an arbitration award favorable to the Union on a contract already 
presented to Salt Lake City, could result in liabilities totalling 
$2,896,000 and hiring 145 additional men. These figures do not 
even consider "wage and salary" issues! 
With considerable insight, the cases above cited have avoided 
these types of problems for their jurisdictions by declaring labor 
sponsored legislation for binding arbitration to be unconstitutional. 
Thus, these States have preserved accountability and responsibility 
for managing the public's business in the elected officials where 
it belongs. As Judge Soden succinctly observed: 
"Harmony is not promoted by compulsion, resolution 
is not wrought by legioning, and public employee strikes 
are already illegal. The task of finding other reason-
able ways to achieve the fstate's goals1 in the public 
labor section (other than binding arbitration) with lesser 
burden on constitutionally protected activity are essen-
tially legislative. These ways must be found and developed 
with renewed awareness of the essential fundamentals of 
our political heritage — the consent of the governed." 
City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 362 N.Y.Supp.2d 698 (1974), 
reversed 332 N.E.2d 290 (N.Y., 1975). 
*» 
The writer whole-heartedly agrees with this Lower New York 
Court and the others above cited. Binding arbitration is not 
compatible with the legislative functions of determining quantity, 
quality and levels of governmental services. Further, the assess-
ment of taxes and the expenditure thereof are inexorably connected. 
These questions rest exclusively with the elected representatives 
of the people. 
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Further, as is clearly illustrated in the Oakland case, 
salaries and wages are not necessarily the major'economic and • 
service issues. The cost of fringe benefits, holidays, the hours 
worked, manning requirements, overtime provisions and other 
matters (which are not wages or salaries) may have a devastating 
fiscal impact upon the City and its budget. Decisions made on 
these issues can determine the rate of taxation, the quantity, 
quality and type of services rendered by the City. 
These decisions under our representative form of government 
must remain with elected officials. Otherwise, the real deci-
sions concerning local government will be made by panels of . 
arbitrators and the elected officials will merely be puppets, 
effectuating their decisions. This cannot and must not be the 
law of Utah. 
Decisions contra to the foregoing analysis and authority are 
not well reasoned or authoritative. For example, Wyoming and * 
Rhode Island have upheld binding arbitration statuses; however, 
they have been severely criticized by judges and commentators. 
They ethereally state that binding arbitration provisions are mere 
policy issues resolved by the Legislature, without seriously 
addressing the illegal delegation problems, or they mysteriously 
convert the arbitration panel into agents of the Legislature. See, 
Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Assfn, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo.r 
1968) ; Providence v. Local 799, International Ass'n of Firefighters, 
304 At.2d 93. 
Professor Sylvester Petro summarized the absurdities of these 
positions as follows:. 
"It is true that some courts are formally accepting 
private arbitration of public-sector disputes, using all 
kinds of makeshift analyses to avoid the obviously uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative power involv^ r? 
r P h £ i VJ\7i~\rrt A v%/-NT r*. «• *~ 
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is no unconstitutional delegation because the arbitrator .. 
is given executive , not legislative, power to resolve 
a dispute involving local firemen—as though the name 
could make any real difference! Other courts have 
struggled to uphold public-sector labor-dispute arbi-
tration on equally absurd grounds. Thus, the Rhode 
Island court has held that the arbitrators become public 
officers or agents of the legislature: 'Collectively,' 
said the court, 'these officers constitute an admini-
strative or governmental agency. This Orwelliam abuse 
of the meaning of the term 'agency, ' though obvious, still 
must be exposed for what it is. An agent is one who serves 
his principal; not one who commands. An agent follows 
directions; he does not give orders. To call neutral 
arbitrators (in a dispute between a union and a government) 
agents of the government makes a mockery of the whole 
arbitration process and deals simple reason and common 
sense a staggering blow. 
"A recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
demonstrates how far the (some) courts are willing to go 
in subordinating popular and legislative sovereignty to 
arbitration of public-sector disputes. The case involved 
the constitutionality of a statute compelling arbitration 
of police and firefighter labor disputes. Admittedly, 
the statute lacked standards effectively controlling the 
arbitrator's award (for what 'standards' could there be?) 
Furthermore, it was recognized that the award might force 
an increase in local taxes, notwithstanding the political 
consensus of the community and existing debt limits for 
the city. In enforcing the award the court said that, if 
necessary, it would itself order the city to raise local 
taxes in order to satisfy the arbitration award. 
"Contemplating such a decision, one wonders at the 
conditions which could bring about so thoroughgoing a 
perversion of our constitutional system. Nothing can be 
clearer .than that, in our system, the courts do not have 
taxing ^ powers — unless it is the proposition that the 
taxing power does not belong to private arbitrators, with 
or without court assistance." Petro, "Sovereignty and 
Compulsory Public-Sector Bargaining." 10 Hake Forest 
L.Rev. 25, 104-105 (1974). (emphasis added) 
Judge Levin also noted the shallowness of these decisions; 
stated: 
"The Supreme Court of Wyoming avoided the real issue 
by refusing to characterize as a delegation of legisla-
tive power the arbitrators power to decide 'wages, hours 
of service, and working conditions.'" Dearborn Fire 
Fighters Union v. City of Dearborn, id. at p. 226. 
(Emphasis added) 
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Concerning the Rhode Island decision, he stated: 
"The Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
arbitrator's 'power to fix salaries of public employees 
is clearly a legislative function', but analyzed a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the delegation in a 
manner which has been correctly criticized as 'wholly 
tautological.'" id. at p. 231 and commentators cited 
therein. (Emphasis added) 
* * * 
"Such nominalistic reasoning both begs the question 
and reduces the analysis of the issue to a reason-free 
debate over labels. Such reasoning could countenance 
the syllogism that all enactments of the Legislature are 
constitutional because the Legislature cannot pass an 
unconstitutional law." id. at p. 232, and cited with 
approval in Greeley Police Union, et al., v. City Council 
of Greeley, Colo., et al., supra at p. 790. 
Likewise, the New York Court failed to analyze the taxation 
without representation question at all. However, interestingly 
it found no illegal delegation because of the "detailed" and 
"specific guidelines" provided for the arbitrators in the New 
York statute. The statute was upheld because: ". . . most impor-
tant, the detailed basis upon which awards are to be determined." 
City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, id. at p. 299-300, n. 4. (Emphasis 
added). Clearly, the New York Court would have ruled that the 
Utah statute lacked these definate legislative guidelines for 
delegation, and its decision would have been different if it had 
the Utah law before it. This issue of standards necessary for a 
valid delegation by a legislative body will be discussed in 
Point IB, Infra. 
However, at this juncture, it is perhaps appropriate to 
discuss appellants' assertion that because labor matters may 
involve a question of state-wide concern. Art. VI, § 29 has . .. . 
no application. It would appear to the writer from reading 
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Appellant's brief, that he is under the impression that Salt Lake 
City is a charter city, which it is not. Further, there is no 
issue in this case involving a conflict between a state statute 
and a charter provision. Therefore, the authority cited which 
discusses when a city charter provision may take precedence over 
a statute is irrelevant to this case. However, even if it were, 
the better reasoned cases make such a decision based on which 
interest "predominates;" that is, the city is not deprived of 
home rule just on the basis of whether or not the matter is of 
ffetate-wide concern." See, City of Beaverton v. International 
Ass'n of Fire Fighters, id. and quoted supra at p. 14. 
Aside from the foregoing observation, the writer has no 
quarrel with the general assertion of appellant, that a Utah city 
is a creature of the Legislature and that (absent constitutional 
grants of right) a city only has those powers and functions which 
have been delegated to the City by the Legislature or those that 
necessarily flow from other powers so delegated. See, Stevenson 
v. Salt Lake City, 7 Ut.2d 28, 317 P.2d 597 (1957). Further, 
Respondent-Salt Lake City, has no quarrel with the general proposi 
tion that matters of state-wide concern can be the subject of a 
general state-wide statute, such as the State Retirement Act or 
a law requiring cities to maintain fire departments. 
However, from those truisms, one cannot completely neuter 
Art. VI, § 29, of the Utah Constitution, which guarantees local 
self government in Utah cities. Defendants-Appellants' argument 
to the contrary can be reduced to the following syllogism: 
-28-
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(1) A city is a creature of the State and has only 
those powers and functions which have been delegated to 
it by the Legislature; 
(2) The Legislature can amend or repeal any function 
given to a city by enacting a general law; thus, a 
"municipal function" is that which is stated as such in 
general legislative enactments; 
(3) Therefore, notwithstanding Art. VI, § 29, of the 
Utah Constitution, the Legislature can appoint a special 
commission to perform any function, by legislatively 
declaring that the issue is no longer a "municipal 
function." 
Such logic reminds one of the reasoning which practically read 
the IX and X Amendments out of the U.S. Constitution, until the 
recent decision of National League of Cities, et al,, v. Usery, 
95 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.ed.2d 45 (1976). 
Certainly, this court has never adopted such circuitous 
and fallacious reasoning as that urged by appellant; rather, it 
has consistently protected cities in their right of self-govern-
ment from the usurpation of these functions by the tyranny of 
appointed commissioners, with binding powers over elected officials. 
Further, it is to be noted that it is one thing for the state to 
subject the cities to regulation or expense through the estab-
lishment of a state-wide retirement fund, minimum wage, or hours 
of work provisions. It is quite a different matter to give 
cities responsibility for setting taxes, wages, hours and terms 
and conditions of employment (above as stated minimum standard) 
and thereby define them as "municipal functions," but with the 
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same legislative pen create an arbitration panel or commission 
with ultimate power to perform them. 
With the statute under discussion, we are not dealing with 
a generally applicable statute, setting labor standards for city 
government. Neither are we dealing with the function that has 
been removed from the jurisdiction or enabling power of a city to 
perform. Further, we are not dealing with a service which has 
been assumed by state government and accountability for that 
function preserved in the people through its elected officers. 
Rather, Utah cities have been delegated the responsibility of 
operating a fire department and establishing the terms and con-
ditions of employment for all city employees. Section 10-6-2 9, 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended• 
Thus, even if one accepted appellants' position, his 
argument fails because the Legislature has not removed these 
areas from the ambit of a "municipal function." 
Determining vacation time, deciding how many men should be 
on a shift, establishing pay scales above minimum wage rates, 
deciding whether men will work 8-hour or 24-hour shifts, and 
other sundry issues concerning the terms and conditions of employ-
ment are "predominantly" of local concern. As such, if local 
self-government is to be preserved, the decision-making power 
concerning these issues cannot be delegated to some non-elected 
ad hoc commission. See, City of Beaverton v. International 
Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 531 P.2d 730, 731, id. and quoted supra 
at p. 14. Our Constitution wisely guaranteed that these 
"municipal functions," including the power to levy taxes for 
them, could not be so delegated. 
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Appellants collection of "policy reasons" on pages 14 through 
19 of their brief, cannot abrogate the Utah Constitution, even if 
they were meritorious. Further, the "entirely obvious" policy 
statements are not axioms; rather, it appears more reasonable to 
the writer to conclude that the reasons stated are merely "make 
weight" assertions invested by the appellants; they were never 
issues considered by the Legislature when it hurriedly passed this 
bill and a batch of other ill-considered legislation on the last 
day of the session. 
One must further observe that there is no issue in this case 
of any Utah city attempting to avoid a state directed standard of 
fire service, as may be inferred from page 15 of Appellants1 brief. 
However, if Appellants1 brief is intended to suggest that a series of 
non-elected, ad hoc arbitration panels are going to establish state 
fire standards from this statute, the writer is even more seriously 
concerned. Certainly, there can be no serious dispute that establish-
ing these standards of fire service is a purely legislative func-
tion; further it is a policy decision that cannot be performed by 
panels of arbitration commissioners. Aside from the fact it would 
be an illegal legislative delegation without standards to govern 
the delegee, this assertion is true because no uniform state policy 
or standards could be expected from such arbitration panels, which 
are separately and independently appointed for each Utah juris-
diction and for each separate contract impasse. 
By advancing the policy argument of uniformity and of state-
wide fire protection standards, one is given a glimpse at the 
broad scope of authority which the Union sponsors of this Legis-
lation envisioned. That scope as set forth in the policy reasons of 
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Appellants1 brief is indeed frightening to those who respect 
democratic processes. In addition, it must be observed that the 
suggested logical tie between a "method" of bargaining between 
cities and their employees and the quality of fire protection 
thereafter provided, is tenuous at best. 
Other policy arguments advanced by appellants are likewise 
suspect; however, for the sake of brevity the writer will only 
further comment that "industrial peace" is not produced by 
collective bargaining and binding arbitration. See, Laffe,', 
"Compulsory Arbitration: The Australian Experience, "95 Monthly 
Labor Rev, 45 (May, 1972); McAvoy, "Binding Arbitration of 
Contract Terms: A new Approach to the Resolution of Disputes 
in Public Sector," 72 Colum. L.Rev. 1192, 1212 (1972); Petro, 
"Sovereignty and Public Sector Bargaining," 10 Wake Forest L.Rev., 
25-37 (1974). • 
It is submitted that the awesome, autocratic power of such 
an arbitration commission, not only offends Utah cities1 con-
stitutionally guaranteed right of self-government, but it fatally 
wounds the democratic principles of representative government by 
its unlawful delegation of legislative prerogatives, including 
the power of tax. It, therefore, should be declared unconsti-
tutional and the decision of the lower court affirmed. 
POINT IB 
EVEN IF THE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO AN 
ARBITRATOR IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL PER SE, SUCH 
DELEGATION IS TOTALLY WITHOUT STANDARDS TO GUIDE 
THE ARBITRATOR AND IS, THEREFORE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Even if some degree of delegation is deemed permissible, it 
is well established that legislative power cannot be delegated 
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without providing sufficient standards to guide the delegee in 
the exercise of that legislative authority. The following is 
representative of the holdings of many cases. 
"'If no standards are set up to guide the administra-
tive agency in the exercise of function conferred on it 
by the legislature, the legislation is void as passing 
beyond the legitimate bounds of delegation of legislative 
power and as constituting a surrender and abdication to 
an alien body of the power which the constitution confers 
on the Senate and the General Assembly alone. Nowhere 
in this act is there any guide furnished to the board of 
arbitration other than that it shall arbitrate 'any and 
all disputes then existing between the public utility 
and the employees. . . .' City of Biddeford v. Biddeford 
Teachers Ass'n, id at p. 399, citing with approval State 
v. Traffic Telephone Workers Federation of New Jersey, 66 
A.2d 616, 625-626 (N.J., 1949). 
Regarding the establishment of a new social mechanism and using 
ad hoc commissions as opposed to permanent administrative bodies, 
this court said: 
". . . (T)here is, thus an even greater need of specific 
standards than there would be in the case of a continuous 
administrative body which might gather experience as it 
went along . . . 
"Standards of delegation are peculiarly required, more 
over, when the legislature is enacting a new pattern of 
social conduct . . .'" City of Biddeford v. Biddeford 
Teachers Ass'n, id. at p. 399, citing State v. Traffic 
Telephone Workers Federation of New Jersey, 66 A.2d 616, 
625-626 (N.J., 1949). 
Even those decisions cited by appellants have supported the 
requirement of specific standards for the arbitration panel. For 
example, the Rhode Island arbitration statute sets forth numerous 
facts which "must" be considered by the arbitrators. Among other 
provisions the statute states: 
" . . . the factors, among others to be given weight by 
the arbitrators in arriving at a decision shall include: 
(a) Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions 
of employment of the fire department in question with 
prevailing wage rates or hourly conditions of employ-
ment of skilled employees of the building trades and 
industry in the local operating area involved. 
(b) Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions 
of employment of the fire department in question with 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
wage rates or hourly conditions of employment maintained 
for the same or similar work of employees exhibiting 
like or similar skills under the same or similar working 
conditions in the local operating area involved. 
(c) Comparison of wage rate or hourly conditions of 
employment of the fire department in question with wage 
rates or hourly conditions of employment of fire depart-
ments in cities or towns of comparable size, 
(d) Interest in welfare for the public. 
(e) Comparison of peculiarities of employment in 
regard to other trades or professions, specifically: 
(1) Hazards in employment; (2) Physical qualifica-
tions; (3) Educational qualifications; (4) Mental 
qualifications; (5) Job training and skills." 
R.I. Gen. Laws, 1956, § 28-9.0-10 quoted in Providence v. 
Local 7 99, International Ass'n of Firefighters, 305 A.2d 
93f (R.I., 1973); See also, n. 4 of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 
332 N.E.2d 290, 299 (N.Y., 1975). 
The New York Court of Appeals stated: 
"A first and most important safeguard is, of course, the 
provision of standards to confine the discretion of the 
panel. Where we have invalidated delegations of power to 
nonelected bodies, it was because such standards were 
totally lacking. (citations omitted) . . . 'The Legisla-
ture may constitutionally confer discretion upon an admin-
istrative agency only if it limits the field in which that 
discretion is to operate and provide standards to govern 
its exercise;f . . ." City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, id. at 
p. 299. (Emphasis added) 
The New York Court thereafter found that there were specific 
guidelines and therefore upheld the New York statute. 
Utah has likewise consistently upheld the principal requiring 
specific legislative guidelines for delegated authority. The 
leading Utah case is State v. Goss, 79 Ut. 559, 11 P.2d 340 (1932) 
This case observed: 
"The legislative power of the state is by the Consti-
tution vested in the Legislature, and, under circumstances 
therein specified, in the people of the state, and such 
legislative power may not by the Legislature be delegated 
to other agencies, except where expressly directed or 
permitted by the Constitution. . . . 
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"'Board and commissions now play an important part 
in the administration of our laws. . . though legislative 
power cannot be delegated to boards and commissions, the 
legislature may delegate to them administrative functions 
in carrying out the purposes of the statute and various 
governmental powers for the more efficient administration 
of our laws.'" 1 Cooley, Constitutional Administration 
(8th Ed.) p. 231. 
"'The legislature in enacting a law complete in itself, 
designated to accomplish the regulation of particular matters 
falling within its jurisdiction, may expressly authorize 
an administrative commission within definite valid limits 
to provide rules and regulations for the complete operation 
and enforcement of the law within its expressed general 
purpose. . . . (citations omitted) 
"'The legislature may not delegate the power to enact a 
law or declare what the law shall be, or to exercise an 
unrestricted discretion in applying a law; but it may enact 
a law complete in itself designed to accomplish the general 
public purpose, and may expressly authorize designated 
officials within definite valid limitation to provide rules 
and regulations for the complete operation and enforcement 
of the law within its expressed general purpose. . . . 
"'. . . (I)n creating such an administrative agency, the 
legislature to prevent its being a pure delegation of legis-
lative power, must enjoin upon it a certain course of pro-
cedure and certain rules of decision in the performance of 
its function.'" State v. Goss, id. at p. 341,, 342, citing 
Wichita R. and L. Company v. Public Utilities Commission, 
246 U.S. 48, 43 S.Ct. 51, 55, 67 L.Ed. 124; See also, 
Revne v. Trade Commission, 113 Ut. 155, 192 P.2d 563 (1948). 
(Emphasis added) 
The Utah statute under consideration has absolutely no guide-
lines, standards or criteria which the arbitration commission may 
use or which limit its discretion. Each ad hoc arbitration panel 
has total carte blanche authority to make any ruling and impose 
any burden (at its unbridled discretion) that it may wish on a 
Utah city. 
It is respectfully submitted that the total absence of any 
legislative standards or guidelines to limit the arbitrary power 
of this commission, in and of itself, makes the Act unconstitutional. 
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POINT II 
THE FIREFIGHTER BINDING ARBITRATION STATUTE 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT IT VIOLATES BOTH 
UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL GUAR-
ANTEES OF EQUAL PROTECTION, DUE PROCESS OF LAW, 
AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST 
SPECIAL LAWS. 
A. GRANTING APPROXIMATELY 350 MEMBERS OF THE 
SALT LAKE CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT, RIGHTS, PRIVI-
LEDGES AND IMMUNITIES NOT EQUALLY PROVIDED TO 
THE OTHER APPROXIMATELY 400 MEMBERS OF THE SALT 
LAKE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT IS AN INVIDIOUS 
DISCRIMINATION AND AN UNREASONABLE CLASSIFICATION. 
Art. I, § 2, of the Utah Constitution provides: 
"All political power is inherent in the people; and all 
free governments are founded on their authority for their 
equal protection and benefit, . . •" 
Further, Art. If § 24, of the Utah Constitution provides: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." 
The case law relating to these two sections of the Utah Con-
stitution clearly provides that laws must be uniform and that 
classes of persons, for or against whom the laws will operatef 
must be established on a rational basis. Such classification 
must be reasonable and not arbitrary. That is, a law is invalid 
if there exists no rational reason for excluding a class of in-
dividuals from this application. 
A representative case illustrating this point is State v. 
J. B. and R. E. Walker, Inc., 116 P.2d 766 (Ut., 1941). In this 
case, the Utah Supreme Court struck down a state statute penali-
zing employers who refused to pay wages due employees, but 
excepted from this requirement banks and mercantile houses. The 
Court noted the classification problems and stated that the 
classifications must be reasonable to survive a constitutional 
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challenge. Regarding this classification issuef the Court cor-
rectly summarized as follows: 
"'In order to see whether the excluded classes or 
transactions are on a different basis than those 
included, we must look at the purpose of the act. The 
objects and purposes of a law present the touchstone 
from determining proper and improper classification. 
"'It is only where some persons or transactions 
excluded from the operation of the law are as to the 
subject matter of the law in no differentiable class 
from those included in its operation that the law is 
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary and 
unconstitutional. . . .'" State v. J. B. and R. E. 
Walker, Inc., 116 P.2d 769, citing State v. Mason, 
78 P.2d 920, 923, 924. — ~ 
The Court further noted; 
"'Before a court can interfere with the legislative 
judgment, it must be able to say that there is no fair 
reason for the law that would not require with equal 
force its extension to others which it leaves untouched.1" 
State v. J. B. and R. E. Walker, Inc., id. at p. 769, 
citing 12 Am.Jur., § 521, p. 271. 
Thereafter, the Court could find no justification for the exclu-
sion of banks and mercantile houses from the labor bills; there-
fore, it held the statute constitutionally defective, as being 
an arbitrary classification of the excluded classes. 
Likewise, the writer is at a loss to find any basis (let 
alone a reasonable basis) to treat the fire department personnel 
differently on the procedural basis of dealing with their employer 
than other city employees, particularly police department per-
sonnel. It is respectfully submitted that even appellant has failed 
to propound any factual or theoretical basis to justify this 
legislatively preferred class which makes fire department per-
sonnel a preferred class by giving them exclusive procedures for 
negotiating the terms and conditions of employment, other than 
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asserting that they are firefighters and work 24 hour shifts. 
Certainly, those distinctions create no basis for differentiating 
the procedural mechanism whereunder they deal with the City on 
negotiating wages or other terms and conditions of employment. 
Thus, the statute is patently discriminatory and violative of 
both Art. I, § 2, and Art. I, § 24, of the Utah Constitution. 
These Utah constitutional provisions are also augumented 
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
which guarantees equal protection under the law and has been 
interpreted to prohibit invidious discrimination without reason-
able classifications. See, Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 
U.S. 105, 111, 18 L.Ed.2d 650 (1967). Experimentation of govern-
ment must cease when it runs afoul of a fundamental constitutional 
right. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 
(1972); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 
(1973). 
Of similar import is the constitutional provisions prohibiting 
"Special Laws." This provision provides: 
"No private or special law shall be enacted where a 
general law can be applicable." Art. VI, § 26, Utah 
Constitution. 
Again, in interpreting this section, this Court has held that 
there must be a reasonable classification. Any law which benefits 
one special group of individuals without a reasonable classifi-
cation is violative of this constitutional provision. This court 
has said: 
"Courts are practically harmonious that, not only 
cities, but many other subjects, may be classified with-
out contravening the constitutional provision that fin 
all cases where a general law can be applicable no special 
law shall be enacted.1" Art. VI, (18), Const.; Board of 
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It has also agreed that the classification must be reasonable 
and natural, and not artificial or arbitrary. In referring to 
the question of classification, this Court has said: 
"A. 'classification must be natural, not artificial. 
It must stand upon some reason, having regard to the 
character of the legislation." Board of Education v. 
Hunter, 150 P. 1019, 1022, 1023 (Ut., 1916), citing 
Edmonds v. Herbrandson, 50 N.W. 970. 
Thereafter, the Court specifically held that a statute providing 
for differing school tax assessments for different districts was 
arbitrary and unreasonable. It held: 
"(W)hat we do hold is that where classifications are 
adopted and limitations are imposed, the law must operate 
and affect all within the same class substantially alike." 
Board of Education v. Hunter, id. at p. 1024. 
Again, the writer would be very interested in learning of 
any distinction which makes the Salt Lake City employees working 
in the fire department unique or distinguishable from any other 
class of municipal employees, when it comes to issues concerning 
labor negotiations. There certainly can be no distinction between 
fire department employees and police department employees and, 
with regard to the question of collective bargaining, the writer 
submits there are no reasonable distinctions between any city 
employee. The rights exclusively granted to some 350 of the City's 
almost 1800 employees is clearly an arbitrary and capricious 
classification; it must be held to be constitutionally defective. 
B. THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATION 
ACT WHICH ATTEMPTS TO FORCE ALL OFFICERS OF THE FIRE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE PLAINTIFF CITIES INTO A SINGLE BAR-
GAINING UNIT, BUT WHICH EXCLUDES OFFICERS FROM BEING 
A MEMBER OF THE BARGAINING TEAM IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
THIS PROVISION IS AN INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND AN 
ARBITRARY UNREASONABLE CLASSIFICATION, AND A SPECIAL 
LAW VIOLATING THESE OFFICERS1 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
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The challenged statute defines the bargaining unit as the 
entire City Fire Department; however, it provides that even 
though the bargaining unit will bargain wages, hours and condi-
tions of employment of all personnel in the Fire Department, 
including officers, the negotiating team may not include those 
officers. It provides: 
"The organization selected by a majority of the fire-
fighters in an appropriate bargaining unit shall act as 
the exclusive bargaining representative for all members 
of the department. . . . 
"No negotiating team of the established bargaining 
unit is appropriate which includes any fire chief, 
assistant chief, battalion or deputy chief, captain or 
lieutenant." Sec. 34-20a-4, Utah Code Ann. 1953. 
(Replacement Vol. 4B, 1975 Pocket Supp.) 
Thus, although the rank and file firefighter can demand that the 
officers be in the bargaining unit and negotiate for their wages, 
salaries and working conditions, the officers, by law, are barred 
from having a voice on the negotiating team. 
This is the same situation as would occur if the Legislature 
commanded that the Utah Court System hold a popular election to 
select a Bargaining Unit, which unit would include judges, 
clerks, bailiffs and other court support personnel. By popular 
vote this group could elect to be considered a bargaining unit 
and include within their number the judges. That group then 
could negotiate wages, salaries and working conditions for all 
of the court system (including judges), but by law, the judges 
would be barred from being a member of the negotiating team and, 
thus, from having a voice thereon. 
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Aside from the serious policy consideration which places 
management personnel and fire department officers in the same 
bargaining unit as the rank and file firefighter, the exclusion 
of officers from the negotiating team is a patently unreasonable 
and arbitrary provision. It denies those plaintiffs-respondents 
Baker and Newman, as officers of the City Fire Department, equal 
protection of the law and in effect disenfranchises them from 
any representation concerning their interests. For the reasons 
-^  above stated in Point 11 A, the law should on its face be declared 
unconstitutional. 
Collaterally, it should be noted that such a provision is 
extremely dangerous in that it leaves the plaintiff cities with 
no management to direct reserve or volunteer firefighters in the 
event of a job action or strike by the firefighters. The position 
is clearly a power play to rob City management of the fidelity 
and loyalty of its management personnel in the firefighting ser-
vice and, thereby, neuter city prerogatives in the event of a 
strike or slow-down effectuated by the Firefighter Union. 
At any rate, it is respectfully submitted that excluding 
officers by law from negotiating team is a denial of due process 
and equal protection of the laws. It is patently an unreasonable 
and arbitrary classification of exclusion of a group which should 
never be part of a labor organization in the first instance. 
POINT III 
SINCE THE ARBITRATION PANEL HAS THE POWER TO DETER-
MINE THE DISPOSITION OF TAX MONEYS, IT HAS THE 
POWER OF TAXATION; THEREFORE, THE NON-ELECTED 
BINDING ARBITRATION PANEL VIOLATES THE ONE-PERSON 
ONE-VOTE RULE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND ART. XI AND SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
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No principle is more firmly rooted in the fabric of American 
life than that there shall be no taxation without representation. 
Our Declaration of Independence lists as a grievance, taxation 
without representation. It declared to the world: 
"He (King George) has combined with others to subject 
us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and 
unacknowledged by our laws; giving as his assent to their 
acts of pretended legislation . . • for imposing taxes 
on us without our consent." Declaration of Independence,] 
As previously documented in the Findings of Fact and Point I 
above, the arbitration panel authorized in the subject law, 
clearly has the power to compel the levying of taxes or alter-
ing the service level. A binding arbitration award on the 
contract already pending before Salt Lake City could require 
the hiring of 145 additional personnel and the imposition of 
approximately 3 million dollars in additional taxes per year 
on Salt Lake City residents. (See, Statement of Fact 4, 5 
and 8). 
The Utah Constitution specifically granted to municipal cor-
porations the power to tax and spend its revenues, consistent 
with the general philosophy of a democratic representative gover-
nment wisely created by the founding fathers. This provision 
provides as follows: 
"The power to be conferred upon the cities by this 
section shall include the following: 
11
 (a) To levy, assess and collect taxes and borrow 
money, within the limits prescribed by general law, and 
to levy and collect special assessments for benefits 
conferred. 
"(b) To furnish all local public service, . . . 
"(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire 
by condemnation, or otherwise, property within its cor-
porate limits necessary for such improvements; . . . " 
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Clearly, the constitutional framers intended to vest in elected 
officials, exclusive control over the collection and distribution 
of tax monies, together with the power to decide what local 
services and the manner in which they would he delivered. The 
statute under consideration patently violates the basic tenets 
of our constitutional democracy. 
In addition to the foregoing, it is to be noted that a 
person may not be disenfranchised from his right to vote on 
matters of taxation and other matters relating to the operation 
of government^ either by malaportioned legislatures which delute 
that vote or through invidious discrimination based on wealth. 
In furtherance of that guarantee of a meaningful ballot, at 
least one court has held that a binding arbitration panel vio-* 
lates the equal protection doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment; 
it held that such an ad hoc, non-elected panel of arbitrators 
abridge the one-person, one-vote rule. Judge Harold R. Soden 
• * 
correctly noted: 
"The one-person, one-vote principle is now clearly 
applicable to local governmental units. . . .", cita-
tions omitted; City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 362 N.Y. 
Supp.2d 698 (N.Y., 1974). 
Referring to the New York binding arbitration panel there under 
discussion, this Judge noted: 
"It is obvious that citizens do not have an equal 
say in the composition of the panel and, furthermore, 
that the inequality presented here is an unconstitu-
tional deviation from the requirement of substantial 
equality of representation." 
He then quoted from Grey v. Sanders, 373 U.S. 389, 381 (1973) 
to note that: 
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" . . . once a state has decided to use a process of 
popular election, and once 'the class of voters is 
chosen and the qualifications specified, we see no con-
stitutional way by which equality of voting power may 
be evaded.1" City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, id. at p. 24. 
That Court thereafter noted: 
"The power the public arbitration panel does have is 
the power of taxation because it has the power to deter-
mine the disposition of tax moneys. Since it does have 
the power of taxation, under the New York precedent that 
considered Baker v. Carr, (369 U.S. 186), and progeny 
that this court has cited above, equality and representa-
tion is required for this legislative body." City of 
Amsterdam v. Helsby, id. at p.24. 
Thus, the court held the binding arbitration provision of this 
law to be an unconstitutional infringement of the one-vote, one-
man rule and violative of the taxation without representation 
concept — the principle upon which American system of democracy 
is founded. Even though this case was subsequently reversed, the 
writer suggests that its logic stands. See, City of Amsterdam 
v. Helsby, supra, at p. 24. ' 
As previously stated, the Utah binding arbitration panel would 
purport to divest the elected of their powers concerning disposi-
tion of tax money, compel in some situations the imposition of 
taxes or the elimination or modification of city services. In a 
very real sense, the panel could determine the type, quantity and 
quality of services provided in Utah cities. Thus, the binding 
arbitration panel in effect disenfranchises the voters of Salt 
Lake City and the other municipal corporation parties-plaintiff 
to this litigation. Therefore, it is clearly an unconstitutional 
attempt to deny the electorate their franchise and the respon-
sibility of the elected officials to perfom their constitutional 
functions. Thus, the bill is unconstitutional and should be so 
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POINT IV 
THE BINDING AND COMPULSORY ARBITRATION PROVISIONS 
OF THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATION ACT ARE NOT 
SEVERABLE; THEREFORE, THE ENTIRE ACT MUST BE 
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL., 
Courts which have considered the severability issue have 
frequently voided entire statutes. This fact is true even where 
severability clauses were included, if the unconstitutional pro-
visions were interrelated and interdependent with the rest of 
the law. This Court has succinctly stated: 
"This court has previously held that even where a 
savings clause existed, where the provisions of the 
statute are interrelated, it is not within the scope 
of this court's function to select valid portions of 
the act and conjecture that they should stand indepen-
dently of the portions which are invalid." State v. 
Salt Lake City, 21 Ut.2d 318, 445 P.2d 691, 696 (1968). 
This court has further reasoned in striking down an entire statute, 
despite the existence of a severability clause, that: 
". . . (the law) is invalid, and the severability clause, 
enacted in 1961 is ineffective, because of the dependency 
of the remaining sections upon the provisions declared 
inoperative,11 Carter v. Beaver County Service Area Act No. 
JL, 16 Ut.2d 280, 399 P.2d 440, 442 (1965). See also, Pride 
Oil Co. v. Salt Lake County, 13 Ut.2d 183, 370 P.2d 355, 
357 (1962). (Emphasis added) 
In considering a virtually identical problem presented by 
the case presently before the bar, the South Dakota Supreme Court 
struck down that State's entire public employee collective bargain-
ing statute. It held the binding arbitration features of it 
unconstitutional and then noted: 
". . . This court has consistently upheld 'any phase 
of the measure if the Legislature would have enacted 
that much without the part the constitution rejects.1 
(citations omitted). 
"This court must agree that (the binding arbitration 
statute) and the remainder of the act is so bound to the 
total concept of binding arbitration to be considered other 
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than wholly interdependent. Certainly, within consti-
tutional limits, the provisions of SDCL 3-18, which 
governs grievance procedures of public, would be made 
confusing by retention of the remaining sections of 
SDCL 9-14A. Clearly, the legislature would not have 
adopted this provision in direct conflict with other 
law had they known that SDCL 9-14A-18 would be declared 
void. .We must declare the whole of the chapter as un-
constitutional." (citations omitted) City of Sioux 
Falls v. Firefighters Local 814, id. at p. 5. 
Likewise, the statute under consideration and its features 
of arbitration are so inexerably intertwined with the whole statute 
that it cannot be subject to a reasonable severance. This court 
would be left to guess at the legislative intent; therefore, the 
decision of the lower court should be affirmed and the entire 
statute declared unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Fire Fighters1 Negotiations Act is patently uncon-
stitutional. Specifically, the law: 
1. Attempts to set up a special commission through a board 
of arbitrators, which board is purportedly authorized to perform 
the municipal functions of effectively determining the level, 
quantity, quality and type of service that can be performed by 
Utah municipal corporations; this control is obtained by the 
Legislature granting binding power to set the terms and conditions 
of employment for city fire department personnel in an ad hoc 
commission. As such, the arbitration provision is clearly a vio-
lation of Art. VI, § 29, of the Utah Constitution. 
2. The binding arbitration provision of the statute is a 
clear delegation of legislative functions, including the power 
to tax, spend tax revenue, and determine the level, quality, 
quantity and type of services to be provided to residents of 
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incorporated areas. Thus, it violates the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and the Equal Protection pro-
vision guaranteeing the right of the electorate to control its 
government through the electorial process. Further, the dis-
enfranchising of the voter and the delegation of these functions 
to a board of arbitrators also violates provisions of Article 
XI, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution which guarantees these 
rights to remain in elected officials. 
3. The bill illegally delegates legislative functions. 
4. Even accepting the delegation as legal, it is constitu-
tionally defective because there are no guidelines or standards 
to govern the use of the delegated authority. 
5. The bill arbitrarily establishes an unreasonable and 
arbitrary classification which invidiously discriminates against 
others similarly situated. Without any rational reason, the 
bill applies exclusively to Utah firemen, to the exclusion of 
Utah police officers and other employees of both the State and 
City governments. Further, the bill purports to force (by 
popular vote) officers of the City Fire Department into the same 
bargaining unit with firefighters; yet, without reason, the law 
bars those same officers from being members of the bargaining 
team. As such, the bill constitutes a special law and violates 
the due process clause and the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, together 
with the similar provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
6. The binding arbitration provision of this statute and 
the provision excluding officers from the bargaining team is so 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
interdependent and connected with the rest of the statute as to 
be nonseverable. Therefore, the entire bill must be declared 
unconstitutional in toto. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the Court 
uphold the lower court and rule that the entire statute under 
discussion is unconstitutional and void. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents 
101 City and County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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34-20a-3. Fire fighters' right to bargain collectively.—Fire fighters 
have the right to bargain collectively about wages, hours, and other con-
ditions of employment with corporate authorities and to be represented 
in such negotiations by a bargaining representative chosen by such fire 
fighters. 
History: L. 1975, ch. 102, § 3. 
34-20a^4. Exclusive bargaining representative—Selection—Exclusions 
from negotiating team.—The organization selected by a majority of fire 
fighters in an appropriate bargaining unit shall act as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative for all members of the department until recogni-
tion of such bargaining representative is withdrawn by a vote of a majority 
of the fire fighters in the department. No negotiating team of the estab-
lished bargaining unit is appropriate which includes any fire chief, assist-
ant chief, battalion or deputy chief, captain or lieutenant. 
History: I*. 1975, ch. 102, § 4. 
34-20a-5. Corporate authority duty—Collective bargaining agreement 
—No-strike clause.—It is the duty of any corporate authority to meet 
and collectively bargain in good faith with the bargaining representative 
within ten days after receipt of written notice from such representative 
that it represents a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit. No 
collective bargaining agreement shall be executed for a period of more than 
two years. Each bargaining agreement shall contain a no-strike clause. 
History: lu 1975, ch. 102, § 5. 
34-20a-6, Notice of request for collective bargaining—Time.—When-
ever wages, rates of pay, or any other matter requiring appropriation of 
money by any city, town or county are included as a matter of collective 
bargaining conducted under this act, it is the obligation of the bargaining 
representative to serve written notice of request for collective bargaining 
vu the corporate authorities at least 120 days before the last day on which 
funds can be appropriated to cover the contract period which is the subject 
of collective bargaining. 
History: I.. 1975, ch. 102, §6. 
34-20a-7. Arbitration.—If the bargaining representative and the cor-
porate authorities are unable to reach an agreement within thirty days 
after negotiations, all unresolved issues shall be submitted to arbitration. 
History: L. 1975, ch. 102, § 7. 
34-20a-8. Procedure for arbitration.—If no agreement is reached with-
in the period prescribed by section 34-20a-7, each party within five days 
after the expiration of such period shall name one individual to serve as 
an arbitrator. Each party shall furnish written notification of the name 
and address of its arbitrator. The two arbitrators within ten days after 
their selection shall make application to the Federal Mediation and Con-
ciliation Service for a list of seven names from which they shall name the 
third arbitrator who shall serve as chairman of the arbitration panel. The 
third arbitrator shall be chosen within five days after receipt of the list 
of arbitrators from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service with 
each party alternately striking one name until six names are stricken. 
The remaining unstricken name shall serve as the third member of *he 
arbitration panel. Formal arbitration shall commence within four days 
after selection of the third arbitrator. 
History: L. 1975, ch. 102, § 8. 
34-20a-9. Board of arbitration—Determination—Final and binding— 
Exception—Expense.—The determination of the majority of the board 
of arbitration thus established shall be final and binding on all matters in 
dispute except in salary or wage matters which shall be considered ad 
visory only. Each party shall pay one-half of the expense of arbitration 
History: L. 1975, ch. 102,
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